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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Matthew James Gonzales appeals from the judgment and sentence

entered upon his guilty plea to felony injury to a child. On appeal, he argues the
district court abused its discretion by denying his post-sentencing motion to
withdraw his guiity plea and by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
While in Gonzales' care for just a matter of minutes on January 21, 2011,
three-year-old AB. sustained multiple injuries, the type and severity of which
were "consistent with abuse."

(R., pp.15-17; PSI, pp.2-3.)

Specifically, she

sustained: (1) an acute subdural hemorrhage (i.e., bleeding between the brain
and the skull), (2) an acute "high-force" fracture of her upper right arm, just below
the shoulder, (3) bilateral multi-layer retinal hemorrhages (i.e., bleeding in the
back of the eyes), and (4) hypoxic/anoxic brain damage (i.e., brain damage
caused by oxygen deprivation). (R., pp.15-17; PSI, p.2.) Gonzales reported to
doctors and AB.'s mother that AB. had fallen while out of his sight and suffered
a seizure.

(R., p.15; PSI, p.2.)

However, Gonzales' version of events was

inconsistent with the nature and extent of AB. 's injuries, which indicated AB.
had "experienced a high-energy trauma," including "abusive head trauma." (R.,
pp.15-17.)

Doctors also ruled out the possibiiity that AB.'s injuries were

preexisting:

Although AB. had been hospitalized approximately two weeks

earlier for injuries she sustained after she reportedly fell out of her crib, doctors
conclusively determined that those previous injuries were unrelated to and did
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"not account for" the subdural and retinal hemorrhages, broken arm
damageA.B. presented with on January 21. (R.,
The state

with

.16-17;

3.)

injury to a

in

original Information that Gonzales "did having the care or custody of a minor
child, A.B., cause or permit said child to be injured, or placed in such situation
that the child's person or health was endangered, by shaking A.B." (R., pp.6768.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state amended the Information by

deleting the words "by shaking A.B."; Gonzales pied guilty to felony injury to a
child, as amended; and the state agreed to recommend a unified sentence of
years, with three years fixed. (R.,

108-115, 117-19; Tr., pp.1-10.) The district

court accepted Gonzales' piea and imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with
five years fixed. (R., pp.122-26.) Gonzales timely appealed from the judgment.
(R., pp.130-33.)
While his appeal was pending, Gonzales moved to withdraw his guilty
plea.

(Augmentation:

6/12/12 Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea; 8/17/12

Amended Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea And To Set Aside Conviction; 9/12/12
Second Amended Motion To VVithdraw Guilty Plea And To Set Aside Conviction;
2/26/13 Affidavit Of Matthew Gonzales In Support Of Motions To Withdraw Guilty
Plea.) He also filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (Augmentation:
8/3/12 Rule 35 Motion.) The district court denied both motions, and also denied
Gonzales' motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
(Augmentations: 6/27 /13 Order Denying Rule 35 Motion; 11 /14/13 Decision On
Defendant's Motions To Reconsider And Withdraw Guilty Plea.)
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Gonzales

thereafter filed an amended notice of appeal.

(11/18/13 Amended Notice Of

Appeal.)

On appeal, the state filed a motion to remand; however, Gonzales filed an
objection to that request and the Court denied the motion.
Motion for Remand, dated June 30, 2014.)
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(Order Denying

ISSUES
Gonzales states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did
district
err in denying Mr.
Withdraw Guilty Plea?
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed
upon Mr. Gonzales a sentence of ten years, with five years
fixed, following his plea of guilty to felony injury to a child?

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
-1

Has Gonzales failed to show the district court abused its discretion
concluding Gonzales failed to carry his burden of establishing any
manifest injustice entitling him to the post-sentencing withdrawal of
guilty plea?

2.

Has Gonzales failed to show the unified sentence of 10 years, with five
years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to felony injury to a child is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts?

I.
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ARGUMENT
I.
Gonzales Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denying His Post-Sentencing Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
After

the

district court

imposed

a sentence

in

excess

of

recommended by the parties, Gonzales moved to withdraw his guilty
(Augmentation: 6/12/12 Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea (hereinafter "Motion");
8/17/12 Amended Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea And To Set Aside Conviction
(hereinafter "Amended Motion"); 9/12/12 Second Amended Motion To Withdraw
Guilty Plea And To Set Aside Conviction (hereinafter "Second Amended
Motion"); 2/26/13 Affidavit Of Matthew Gonzales In Support Of Motions To
Withdraw Guilty Plea (hereinafter "Affidavit").)
specific justification
to withdraw his plea.

Gonzales did not offer any

the request in either his original or first amended motion
generally Motion; Amended Motion.) In his second

amended motion, filed five months after he was sentenced, Gonzales claimed
the first time that his plea was "defective in that at the time [he] entered his guilty
plea, [he] never admitted to any facts that would implicate culpability to support
the alleged crime" and that the "guilty plea [did] not support either the mens rea
or actus rea [sic] for the crime of Injury to Child." (Second Amended Motion,
pp.1-2.) Nearly five months after that, Gonzales filed an affidavit alleging, inter
afia, that he pied guilty in reliance on trial counsel's representation that, to secure

a conviction, the state only had to prove he "was in the house" and "was being
inattentive" when A.

sustained her injuries. (Affidavit, p.6.)

5

district court ultimately denied Gonzales' motions

withdraw

guilty plea, concluding Gonzales failed to carry his burden of demonstrating
manifest injustice necessitating withdrawal of

plea.

11 /1
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Decision On Defendant's Motions To Reconsider And Withdraw Guilty Plea
(hereinafter "Decision").)

Specifically, the court found that Gonzales failed to

present any evidence to establish his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entered.

(Decision, pp.8-9.)

The court also found that Gonzales'

admissions, entered on the record at the change of plea hearing, satisfied the
elements of felony injury to a child. (Decision, pp.9-11.)
Gonzales challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
arguing as he did below that he "did not understand the elements of the offense
at the time of his plea" and, as such, the "plea could not have been knowing,
intelligent and voluntary."

(Appellant's brief, p.6.)

Gonzales has failed to

establish an abuse of discretion because the issue of whether his counsel
provided incorrect legal advice in relation to his guilty plea is one of ineffective
assistance of counsel that must be addressed in post-conviction proceedings
rather than on a motion

B.

to withdraw the guilty plea. 1

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion, as

The state is asserting a legal theory and analysis other than that utilized by the
district court. A correct ruling entered on an erroneous basis will be affirmed on
the correct legal basis. See,~, State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, _ , 325 P.3d
673, 677 (Ct. App. 2014).
1
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distinguished

arbitrary

. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho

51, 53 (1993); State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298,
State v. Jackson,

Idaho

1,

1p

281, 284 (1990);

587, 532 P.2d 926, 929 (1975).

the denial of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the appellate
court examines the entire record to determine whether it is manifestly unjust
preclude the defendant from withdrawing a guilty plea. State v. Banuelos, 1
Idaho 569, 574, 861 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Gonzales Failed To Show Any
Manifest lniustice Entitling Him To \/Vithdraw His Guilty Plea
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after

sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298, 787 P.2d 281,284 (1990);
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 14_5, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A
court may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing
upon a satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is
necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." I.C.R 33(c). The strictness of the
standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty plea. "A plea of guilty has
the same force and effect as a judgment rendered after a full trial on the

"

Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App. 1982). The
stricter standard also insures that the defendant is not "encouraged to plead
guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and withdraw the plea if the
sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d
734, 737 (Ct.

. 2009). The defendant has the burden of proving that the
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be withdrawn.
Gomez, 124
As he did

1

Stone, 147 Idaho at 333, 208 P.3d at

State v.

178, 857 P.2d 656, 657 (Ct. App. 1993).
argues his

was

because his attorney erroneously informed him of the mental state necessary for
guilt and this error was never corrected on the record. (Appellant's brief, pp. 815.) Because Gonzales' claim is at its core a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the district court should have declined to consider it and instead allowed
Gonzales to assert the claim in a petition for post-conviction relief.

1. Gonzales' Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Is Properly
Considered In Post-Conviction Relief
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109,
111 (1991); State v. Salazar-Garcia, 145 Idaho 690,692, 183 P.3d 778, 780 (Ct.
App. 2008). As a matter of constitutional due process, a plea is voluntary and
intelligent if the defendant understands the nature of the charge to which he or
she is pleading guilty, including the critical elements of the charged offense.
Salazar-Garcia, 145 Idaho at 692, 183 P.3d at 780 (citing, inter alia, Bradshaw v.
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645-47
(1976)); Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 792, 152 P.3d 1237, 1240 (Ct. App.
2007) (citing, inter alia, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)).

"Due

process does not require, however, that an explanation of every element of the
offense must always be given to the defendant on the record before a valid guilty
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plea may be taken." Martinez, 143 Idaho at 792, 152 P.3d at 1240 (citing State
v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004)); see also
Morgan, 426 U.S. at 647 n.18 (assuming "notice of the true nature, or substance,
of a charge" does not "always require[] a description of every element of the
offense").

Rather, there are other means by which a defendant may "gain an

adequate understanding of the offense to permit a valid guilty plea." SalazarGarcia, 145 Idaho at 692, 183 P.3d at 780 (citing Bradshaw, 545 U.S. 175;
Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583). Among the "[s]ignificant factors" to
consider in assessing whether a defendant had actual notice of the elements of
the charge to which he or she pied guilty is "whether the charge or a pleaded
element of the charge is a self-explanatory term or has such a simple or
common meaning that a lay person can be expected to be aware of it." SalazarGarcia, 145 Idaho at 692-93, 183 P.3d at 780-81 (citing Martinez, 143 Idaho at
793, 152 P.3d at 1241; Mayer, 139 Idaho at 645-49, 84 P.3d at 581-85; Noel v.
State, 113 Idaho 92, 95-96, 741 P.2d 728, 731-32 (Ct. App. 1987)).
In this case the state concedes that the record does not affirmatively
demonstrate that the mental state element of the charge was explained to
Gonzales.

However, Gonzales' claim that he misunderstood that element was

asserted in his affidavit as follows: "[Defense counsel] also told me that all [the
prosecutor] had to prove was that I was being inattentive" and "that all the State
had to prove was that I was in the house and therefore I was responsible for the
injuries." (Affidavit, p. 6.) He decided to plead guilty because a trial was "too
risky if all the State had to prove was that I wasn't being attentive." (Affidavit, p.

g

6.) Gonzalez' claim is thus ultimately one of ineffective assistance of counsel. It
has long been the law that the "proper forum" for claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel "is post conviction proceedings as provided by I.C, § 19-4901 et seq."
State v. Blackburn, 99 Idaho 222, 222-23, 579 P.2d 1205, 1205-06 (1978). In
State v. Haves, 138 Idaho 761, 763, 69 P.3d 181, 183 (Ct. App. 2003), Hayes
moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that his counsel was ineffective.

The

district court declined to address the claim, concluding that development of a
proper evidentiary record "could best be done in the context of a post-conviction
proceeding."

!<L at

766, 69 P.3d at 186. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed,

stating that it does not "ordinarily" address "claims of ineffective assistance on
direct appeal ... because the record on direct appeal is rarely adequate for
review of such claims."

!<L

Addressing such claims without an adequate record

could also result in an incorrect decision becoming "res judicata, thereby barring
the claim in a post-conviction action."

!<L

These considerations apply here and the same outcome as in Hayes
should be reached in this case.

Gonzales claimed in his affidavit that his

attorney affirmatively misled him about the mental state element by informing
him that proof of negligence was sufficient for conviction.

Three times he

requested an evidentiary hearing on those claims, all of which the district court
denied. (Decision on Defendant's Motions and Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing,
pp. 5-8; Order Denying Second Motion to Set Evidentiary Hearing and Second
Motion to Transport; Decision, p. 4 (augmentation).)

Gonzalez was clearly

attempting to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective
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assistance of counsel in this case when such hearings should be reserved for
post-conviction proceedings.
The district court concluded that the record demonstrated that Gonzales'
plea admitted he acted willfully.

(Decision, pp. 10-11.)

The district court,

however, applied the LC. § 18-101 definition of willfully (Decision, p. 10), which
was erroneous. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002). Applying
the correct legal standard as articulated in Young, the state concedes that the
plea colloquy specifically, and the record generally, do not disprove Gonzales'
claim that he believed the standard was negligence because his attorney told
him so. Because the district court did not reach the issue of what advice counsel
provided, however, that is an as-yet unresolved factual question.

The state

submits that resolution of that factual question should occur in post-conviction
proceedings.

2. Gonzales' Claim That He Did Not Specifically Admit His Conduct Was
Willful Does Not Establish Manifest Injustice
Gonzales argues that "willfulness was never established" by his plea.
(Appellant's brief, p. 14. 2 ) To the extent he is arguing that failure to admit all
elements of the crime is grounds for withdrawal of his plea, such is not supported
by law.

To the contrary, a valid guilty plea may be entered without any

Gonzales argues that the lack of a specific admission of willfulness "combined
with the statements in his affidavit" show he misunderstood the mental state
element of the crime. (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) Because the argument that the
motion to withdraw should have been granted based on counsel's erroneous
advice is set forth elsewhere in the brief (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-17), the state
interprets this argument as a claim that the record does not refute his claim of an
erroneous understanding based on counsel's advice.
2
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admission of guilt. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). Any failure
to specifically and on the record admit the mental state associated with the crime

does not render the plea invalid or show manifest injustice.

11.
Gonzales Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Gonzales challenges the unified sentence of 10 years, with five years

fixed, imposed upon his conviction for felony injury to a child. (Appellant's brief,
pp.18-21.) A review of the record supports the sentence imposed.

Gonzales

has failed to establish the sentencing court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
sentencing court abused its discretion. JQ,_

C.

Gonzales Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any
Reasonable View Of The Facts
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the
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primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of

deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. lg_,_
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citation omitted). "vVhen reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court
will make an independent examination of the record, having regard to the nature
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public
interest." lg_,_ Contrary to Gonzales' arguments on appeal, an examination of the
record in this case shows his sentence is eminently reasonable.
Gonzales was responsible for inflicting the following injuries on a three
year old: (1) an acute subdural hemorrhage (i.e., bleeding between the brain and
the skull), (2) an acute "high-force" fracture of her upper right arm, just below the
shoulder, (3) bilateral multi-layer retinal hemorrhages (i.e., bleeding in the back
of the eyes), and (4) hypoxic/anoxic brain damage (i.e., brain damage caused by
oxygen deprivation).

(Tr., p. 100, Ls. 2-10, p. 103, Ls. 4-18 (finding that

Gonzales inflicted the injuries); R., pp.15-17; PSI, p.2.)

The district court

considered the legal factors (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 2-5; p. 105, Ls. 10-22) and
mitigating circumstances (Tr., p. 105, L. 23 - p. 106, L. 12).

It considered

Gonzales' criminal record, which the district court concluded demonstrated a
"reckless disregard for the safety of others" and "undue risk" Gonzales would
commit another crime if put on probation. (Tr., p. 104, Ls. 5-23.) Ultimately the
sentence, however, rested on the nature of the crime and the harm it caused.
(Tr., p. 106, L. 12 - p. 107, L. 5.)

The district court also ran the sentence
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concurrent with a prior sentence being imposed on a probation violation. (Tr., p.
109, L. 11 - p. 111, L. 9.) The record supports the district court's exercise of
discretion.

Gonzales argues that the "strong support from his family" is an "important
fact that should have received the attention of the district court," that he has a
good employment record, and that he expressed remorse. (Appellant's brief, pp.
18-20.)

This argument is baseless because the district court specifically

considered Gonzales' family support, history as "a hard worker," and his feelings
of "true remorse." (Tr., p. 106, Ls. 2-21.) Because the district court specifically
considered the factors Gonzales identifies as mitigating and properly exercised
its discretion under the applicable legal standards, he has failed to show any
abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
sentence, with the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel being reserved for
post-conviction proceedings.
DATED this y!h day of July 2014.

~EN!;fETH JORGENSEN
~ t y Attorney General
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